See: WWDC presentation on "What's New in Apple File Systems" and "What's /System/Volumes/Data?". This is not strictly part of SIP, and is not disabled by disabling SIP. ![]() Starting in Catalina (10.15), protection of most system files is strengthened by storing them on a separate read-only volume. See: "What and how does macOS Mojave implement to restrict applications access to personal data?" This is generally considered a separate feature (called Personal Information Protection, or TCC), but it's based on SIP and disabling SIP disables it as well. Starting in Mojave (10.14), access to users' personal information (email, contacts, etc) is restricted to apps that the user has approved to access that info. Starting in Sierra (10.12), some launchd configuration settings cannot be changed (for example, some launch daemons cannot be unloaded). But since v10.10.4 Apple has had a way to enable trim support for third-party SSDs, the #1 reason to use unsigned kexts has gone away. Note that this replaces the old system for enforcing kext signing (and the old ways of bypassing it). by Apple or an Apple-approved developer). You can't load kernel extensions (kexts) unless they're properly signed (i.e. opensnoop) will not be able to monitor & report on many system processes. It also means that dtrace-based tools for system monitoring (e.g. This does block some significant things like injecting code into the built-in Apple apps (notably the Finder). Again, not too much of a big deal developers can still debug their own programs. those running from those system locations) for things like debugging (or changing what dynamic libraries they load, or some other things). You can't attach to system processes (e.g. When you upgrade to El Capitan, it moves any "unauthorized" files from restricted areas to /Library/SystemMigration/History/Migration-(some UUID)/QuarantineRoot/. Of course, this file is itself in a restricted area. The full list of restricted directories (and exceptions like /usr/local and a few others) is in /System/Library/Sandbox/nf. It also prevents block-level writes to the startup disk, so you can't bypass it that way. ![]() Homebrew) go in /usr/local (or sometimes /etc or /opt), this shouldn't be a big deal. But since normal OS X-style customizations go in /Library (or ~/Library, or /Applications), and unix-style customizations (e.g. ![]() Only Installer and software update can modify these areas, and even they only do it when installing Apple-signed packages. You can't modify anything in /System, /bin, /sbin, or /usr (except /usr/local) or any of the built-in apps and utilities. Here's what it restricts, even from root: But the restrictions it places on root aren't that bad they don't prevent most "normal" system customization. The bad part of this, of course, it that it must also apply to things you're doing intentionally. SIP adds another layer of protection, which malware can't penetrate even if it gets root. by presenting an auth dialog to the user, which will cause the user to reflexively enter the admin password). Essentially, the idea is that it's too easy for malware to get root access (e.g. What it really does is limit the power of the root account, so that even if you become root, you don't have full control over the system. First: the name "rootless" is misleading, since there's still a root account, and you can still access it (the official name, "System Integrity Protection", is more accurate).
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